A surprising contact on the professional network. A proposal of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, based in the Asian nation. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company peppered with confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money favored.
It may seem clear, in this scenario, that an element about this method would be amiss. Nevertheless, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 the agency's director stated operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a fresh campaign aimed at elected officials and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was distributed on Tuesday via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the wider public better identify communications with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the effect of uncovering more information from in and around parliament, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency aims for public figures to recognize that just because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the awkward collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for China – a charge they rejected – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Strategic Goals
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a criminal offense if a person participates in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Variations and Ongoing Cyber Threats
In part there are cultural differences as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone rapidly peripheral turning important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at secret information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold below the level of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of millions connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in relentless attempts to find secret informants on UK politics online because it wants to be challenging, to demonstrate power and because it can.
